Electrical and Computer Engineering
Rice Networks Group
research Associate, Secure Mobile Networking Lab
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Practical Known-Plaintext Attacks against Physical Layer Security in Wireless MIMO Systems
Thursday, February 27, 2014
to 5:00 PM
1064 George R. Brown Hall
6100 Main St
Houston, Texas, USA
Physical layer security schemes for wireless communication systems have been broadly studied from an information theory point of view. In contrast, there is a dearth of attack methodologies to analyze the achievable security on the physical layer. To address this issue, we develop a novel attack model for physical layer security schemes, which is the equivalent to known-plaintext attacks in cryptoanalysis. In particular, we concentrate on analyzing the security of orthogonal blinding schemes that disturb an eavesdropper’s signal reception using artificial noise transmission. We discuss the theory underlying our attack methodology and develop an adaptive filter trained by known-plaintext symbols to degrade the secrecy of orthogonal blinding. By means of simulation and measurements on real wireless channels using software-defined radios with OFDM transceivers, we obtain the operating area of our attack and evaluate the achievable secrecy degradation. We are able to reduce the secrecy of orthogonal blinding schemes to Symbol Error Rates (SERs) below 10% at an eavesdropper, with a knowledge of only a 3% of the symbols transmitted in typical WLAN frames.
Host: Edward Knightly
Biography of Matthias Schulz:
Matthias Schulz received his master degree in electrical engineering and information technology from Technische Universität Darmstadt in 2013. From September 2010 to April 2011 he participated in an exchange program with the University of Ottawa in Canada. Currently he is working towards his PhD in computer science as a research associate at the Secure Mobile Networking Lab at Technische Universität Darmstadt. His research interests are physical layer security and wireless multi-antenna systems.